

Risks People Take and Games People Play

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It's About This Aircraft



Photo: Alan Wilson, licensed under Creative Commons

Which Once Looked Like This



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But Now Looks Like This



Photo: Dominique Faget/AFP, from Aviation Herald WWW page

How To Tell If It's Going To Happen


- Think before you fly: what are the risks?
- Are they qualitative?
 - ▶ and then put numbers to them and perform a PRA?
- How do you distinguish pertinent risks
 - ▶ Somebody collides with me in dense traffic on take-off
- from non-pertinent risks
 - ▶ All the molecules in my left wing move 1m sideways at the same time
- even qualitatively it's difficult!

I have a suggestion.....

Taking a Bet


- Is PBL going to be run over by a bus in Bristol?
- How to reckon the chances?

PBL Is Run Over By A Bus in Bristol



- The chances of me being run over...bus...Bristol ...
 - ▶ are zero when I am not in Bristol
 - ▶ become non-zero only when I arrive
 - ▶ go to zero again when I depart


A Finer Representation



How Fine Need We Go?

- Depends on your needs
 - ▶ bus company insurance: am I ever in Bristol during the fixed insurance period?
 - ▶ my travel insurance: in the one-week period?
 - ▶ me: when I'm on or near the street in Bristol

The General Picture



Should We Fly Over Afghanistan?

- Assumption: We do not want to get shot down!
- Is there anything that could reach us?
- Sure, International Security Assistance Force assets
- Do we trust ISAF?
 - ▶ do we trust the component forces individually?
 - ▶ we regularly do so in their home countries
 - ▶ we assume the same or similar discipline wrt assets
 - ▶ Conclusion: Yes, risk with ISAF is "usual"
 - ▶ we also trust them to tell us when it's not safe
- What about the opponents of ISAF?
 - ▶ They do not have the assets
 - ▶ Ergo: quasi-step-function is flat, effectively zero
 - ▶ (there is a slim chance somebody might have given them an asset)
- Anyone else? Locally-trained forces. No access to assets

Fly Over Afghanistan? Chances of Shootdown

- ISAF: Same or similar to risk flying over ISAF home countries
 - ▶ Acceptable risk
- Opponents: Effectively zero risk
- Locally-trained forces: effectively zero risk
- Anyone else? No.

Calculation: **Acceptable + Effectively 0 + Effectively 0 = Acceptable**

Should We Fly Over Ukraine?

- Same Assumption: We do not want to get shot down!
- Is there anything that could reach us?
- Sure, Ukrainian military assets
- Russian military assets
- Maybe, or maybe not, Rebel military assets

For Example, One of These



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Or One of These



Photo: Mike Freer, Touchdown Aviation, licensed under GFDL 1.2

Or Even One of These



Photo: avjol, licensed under Creative Commons

Which, When Complete, Looks Like This



Photo: Vitali V. Kuzmin, licensed under Creative Commons

Or Maybe, Some Have Suggested, One of These



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Fly Over Ukraine? Chances of Shootdown


- Ukrainian Assets
 - ▶ Acceptable/unacceptable risk?
- Russian Assets
 - ▶ Acceptable/unacceptable risk?
- Rebel Assets
 - ▶ Acceptable/unacceptable risk?
- Anyone else? No.

Calculation: **For the Discussion!**

A General Approach

- Why-Because Analysis (WBA) allows graphical representation of incident causality
 - ▶ Uses the Counterfactual Test to establish causality between possible factors
 - ▶ Many examples of Why-Because Graphs (WBG) in the WBA pages on the Uni Bielefeld RVS Group WWW site www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de
- Causal Control Flow Diagrams (Sieker) allow representation of causality in feedback
 - ▶ same causal semantics as WBG
 - ▶ allows loops, for there may be and often is feedback
 - ▶ Examples from Sieker on the Causalis WWW site www.causalis.com
- Causal Fault Analysis (CFA) and Graph (CFG)
 - ▶ same causal semantics as WBG and CCFD
 - ▶ allows alternatives - there is a special OR connective node
 - ▶ thereby allows expression of limited uncertainty


A Causal Fault Graph



Annotating CFGs

- One can annotate any causal factor in a CFG with a quasi-Boolean (qB)
 - ▶ either a quasi-step function as before = quasi-Boolean-1
 - ▶ or a flat line = quasi-Boolean-0


A CFG/WBG subgraph with qB assignments



Propagating qB-0's through the CFG

- qB-0 propagates upwards through NCF edges
- but not through disjunctives
- this follows from the semantics of NCF (= necessary causal factor, WBA-speak)

CFG/WBG + qB propagating



Pruning After Propagation

- When the CFG has been annotated and propagated, $qB-0$ annotated nodes may simply be eliminated
- The smaller CFG that is left represents the current possible events and behaviours leading to the fault

Experience with CFGs

- Causalis has performed CFA and derived CFGs for clients
- They are far better and more accurate, especially more complete, than industry-typical FMEA
- Which should not be that surprising, since there is no semantics behind FMEA, whereas WBA, CCFD and CFA are all backed up with rock-solid semantics
- So please ask us to do one for you!

Finish

All done

Fertig

Thanks

Fini

So much

Danke

Merci !

Thank you all folks!